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Abstract
The article provides an introduction to the study of meaning in modern semantics. 
Major tenets, tools, and goals of semantic theorizing are illustrated by discussing typical 
approaches to three central characteristics of natural language meaning: truth conditions, 
compositionality, and context and  discourse.
1.  Introduction
Meaning is a key concept of cognition, communication and culture, and there is a diver-
sity of ways to understand it, refl ecting the many uses to which the concept can be put. In 
the following we take the perspective on meaning developed within linguistics, in partic-
ular modern semantics, and we aim to explain the ways in which semanticists approach, 
describe, test and analyze meaning. The fact that semantics is a component of linguistic 
theory is what distinguishes it from approaches to meaning in other fi elds like philos-
ophy, psychology, semiotics or cultural studies. As part of linguistic theory, semantics is 
characterized by at least the following  features:
1.  Empirical coverage: It strives to account for meaning in all of the world’s  languages.
2.  Linguistic interfaces: It operates as a subtheory of the broader linguistic system, 
interacting with other subtheories such as syntax, pragmatics, phonology and 
 morphology.
3.  Formal expliciteness: It is laid out in an explicit and precise way, allowing the com-
munity of semanticists to jointly test it, improve it, and apply it to new theoretical 
problems and practical  goals.
4.  Scientifi c paradigm: It is judged on the same criteria as other scientifi c theories, viz. 
coherence, conceptual simplicity, its ability to unify our understanding of diverse 
phenomena (within or across languages), to raise new questions and open up new 
horizons for  research.
In the following we exemplify these four features on three central issues in modern 
semantic theory that defi ne our understanding of meaning: truth conditions, composi-
tionality, and context and  discourse.
2 I. Foundations of semantics
2.  Truth
If one is to develop an explicit and precise scientifi c theory of meaning, the fi rst thing 
one needs to do is to identify some of the data which the theory will respond to, and 
there is one type of data which virtually all work in semantics takes as fundamental: 
truth conditions. At an intuitive level, truth conditions are merely the most obvious way 
of understanding the meaning of a declarative sentence. If I say It is raining outside, I 
have described the world in a certain way. I may have described it correctly, in which case 
what I said is true, or I may have described it incorrectly, in which case it is false. Any 
competent speaker knows to a high degree of precision what the weather must be like 
for my sentence to count as true (a correct description) or false (an incorrect descrip-
tion). In other words, such a speaker knows the truth conditions of my sentence. This 
knowledge of truth conditions is extremely robust – far and wide, English speakers can 
make agreeing judgments about what would make my sentence true or false – and as a 
result, we can see the truth conditions themselves as a reliable fact about language which 
can serve as part of the basis for semantic  theory.
While truth conditions constitute some of the most basic data for semantics, different 
approaches to semantics reckon with them in different ways. Some theories treat truth 
conditions not merely as the data which semantics is to deal with, but more than this 
as the very model of sentential meaning. This perspective can be summarized with the 
slogan “meaning is truth conditions”, and within this tradition, we fi nd statements like 
the  following:
(1)  [[ It is raining outside ]]t,s = TRUE iff it is raining outside of the building where the 
speaker s is located at time t, and = FALSE  otherwise.
The double brackets [[ X ]] around an expression X names the semantic value of X in 
the terms of the theory in question. Thus, (1) indicates a theory which takes the semantic 
value of a sentence to be its truth value, TRUE or FALSE. The meaning of the sentence, 
according to the truth conditional theory, is then captured by the entire statement (1).
Although (1) represents a truth conditional theory according to which semantic value 
and meaning (i.e., the truth conditions) are distinct (the semantic value is a crucial com-
ponent in giving the meaning), other truth conditional theories use techniques which 
allow meaning to be reifi ed, and thus identifi ed with semantic value, in a certain sense. 
The most well-known and important such approach is based on possible  worlds:
(2) a.  [[ It is raining outside ]]w,t,s = TRUE iff it is raining outside of the building where 
the speaker s is located at time t in world w, and = FALSE  otherwise.
 b.  [[ It is raining outside ]]t,s = the set of worlds {w : it is raining outside of the 
building where the speaker s is located at time t in world w}
A possible world is a complete way the world could be. (Other theories use constructs 
similar to possible worlds, such as situations.) The statement in (2a) says virtually the 
same thing as (1), making explicit only that the meaning of It is raining outside depends 
not merely on the actual weather outside, but whatever the weather may turn out to be. 
Crucially, by allowing the possible world to be treated as an arbitrary point of evaluation, 
as in (2a), we are able to identify the truth conditions with the set of all such points, as 
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in (2b). In (2), we have two different kinds of semantic value: the one in (2a), relativized 
to world, time, and speaker, corresponds to (1), and is often called the extension or ref-
erence. That in (2b), where the world point of evaluation has been transferred into the 
semantic value itself, is then called the intension or sense. The sense of a full sentence, 
for example given as a set of possible worlds as in (2b), is called a proposition. Specifi c 
theories differ in the precise nature of the extension and intension: The intension may 
involve more or different parameters than w, t, s, and several of these may be gathered 
into a set (along with the world) to form the intension. For example, in tense semantics, 
we often see intensions treated as sets of pairs of a world and a  time.
The majority of work in semantics follows the truth conditional approach to the 
extent of making statements like those in (1)–(2) the fundamental fabric of the theory. 
Scholars often produce explicit fragments, i.e. mini-theories which cover a subset of a 
language, which are actually functions from expressions of a language to semantic values, 
with the semantic values of sentences being truth conditional in the vein of (1)–(2). But 
not all semantic research is truth conditional in this explicit way. Descriptive linguistics, 
functional linguistics, typological linguistics and cognitive linguistics frequently make 
important claims about meaning (in a particular language, or crosslinguistically). For 
example, Wolfart (1973: 25), a descriptive study of Plains Cree states: “Semantically, 
direction serves to specify actor and goal. In sentence (3), for instances, the direct theme 
sign /ā/ indicates the noun atim as goal, whereas the inverse theme sign /ekw/ in (4) marks 
the same noun as actor.”
(3) nisēkihānān  atim
 scare(1p-3) dog(3)
 ‘We scare the dog.’
(4) nisēkihikonān  atim
 scare(3-1p) dog(3)
 ‘The dog scares us.’
Despite not being framed as such, this passage is implicitly truth conditional. Wolfart is 
stating a difference in truth conditions which depends on the grammatical category of 
direction using the descriptions “actor” and “goal”, and using the translations of cited 
examples. This example serves to illustrate the centrality of truth conditions to any 
attempt to think about the nature of linguistic  meaning.
As a corollary to the focus on truth conditions, semantic theories typically take 
relations like entailment, synonymy, and contradiction to provide crucial data as well. 
Thus, the example sentence It is raining outside entails (5), and this fact is known to any 
competent  speaker.
(5) It is raining outside or the kids are playing with the water  hose.
Obviously, this entailment can be understood in terms of truth conditions (the truth of 
the one sentence guarantees the truth of the other), a fact which supports the idea that 
the analysis of truth conditions should be a central goal of semantics. It is less satisfying 
to describe synonymy in terms of truth conditions, as identity of truth conditions doesn’t 
in most cases make for absolute sameness of meaning, in an intuitive sense – consider 
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Mary hit John and John was hit by Mary; nevertheless, a truth conditional defi nition of 
synonymy allows for at least a useful concept of synonymy, since people can indeed judge 
whether two sentences would accurately describe the same circumstances, whereas it’s 
not obvious that complete intuitive synonymy is even a useful concept, insofar as it may 
never occur in natural  language.
The truth conditional perspective on meaning is intuitive and powerful where it 
applies, but in and of itself, it is only a foundation. It doesn’t, at fi rst glance, say anything 
about the meanings of subsentential constituents, the meanings or functions of non-
declarative sentences, or non-literal meaning, for example. Semantic theory is respon-
sible for the proper analysis of each of these features of language as well, and we will see 
in many of the articles in this handbook how it has been able to rise to these challenges, 
and many  others.
3.  Compositionality
A crucial aspect of natural language meaning is that speakers are able to determine 
the truth conditions for infi nitely many distinct sentences, including sentences they 
have never encountered before. This shows that the truth conditions for sentences (or 
whatever turns out to be their psychological correlate) cannot be memorized. Speakers 
do not associate truth conditions such as the ones given in (1) or (2) holistically with 
their respective sentences. Rather, there must be some principled way to compute the 
meaning of a sentence from smaller units. In other words, natural language meaning is 
essentially combinatorial. The meaning of a complex expression is construed by com-
bining the meaning of its parts in a certain way. Obviously, syntax plays a signifi cant role 
in this process. The two sentences in (6), for instance, are made up of the same lexical 
material. It is only the different word order that is responsible for the different sentence 
meanings of (6a) and (6b).
(6) a. Caroline kissed a  boy.
 b. A boy kissed  Caroline.
In a similar vein, the ambiguity of a sentence like (7) is rooted in syntax. The two read-
ings paraphrased in (7a) and (7b) correspond to different syntactic structures, with the 
PP being adjoined either to the verbal phrase or to the direct object  NP.
(7) Caroline observed the boy with the  telescope.
 a. Caroline observed the boy with the help of the  telescope.
 b. Caroline observed the boy who had a  telescope.
Examples such as (6) and (7) illustrate that the semantic combinatorial machinery takes 
the syntactic structure into account in a fairly direct way. This basic insight lead to the 
formulation of the so-called “principle of compositionality”, attributed to Gottlob Frege 
(1892), which is usually formulated along the following  lines:
(8) Principle of  compositionality:
  The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and 
the way they are syntactically  combined.
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According to (8), the meaning of, e.g., Caroline sleeps is a function of the meanings of 
Caroline and sleeps and the fact that the former is the syntactic subject of the latter. 
There are stronger and weaker versions of the principle of compositionality, depending 
on what counts as “parts” and how exactly the semantic combinatorics is determined by 
the syntax. For instance, adherents of a stronger version of the principle of composition-
ality typically assume that the parts that constitute the meaning of a complex expression 
are only its immediate constituents. According to this view, only the NP [Caroline] and 
the VP [kissed a boy] would count as parts when computing the sentence meaning for 
(6a), but not (directly) [kissed] or [a  boy].
Modern semantics explores many different ways of implementing the notion of com-
positionality formally. One particularly useful framework is based on the mathematical 
concept of a function. It takes the meaning of any complex expression as being the result 
of applying the meaning of one of its immediate parts (= the functor) to the meaning 
of its other immediate part (= the argument). With functional application as the basic 
semantic operation that is applied stepwise, mirroring the binary branching of syntax, 
the function-argument approach allows for a straightforward syntax-semantics  mapping.
Although there is wide agreement among semanticists that, given the combinato-
rial nature of linguistic meaning, some version of the principle of compositionality must 
certainly hold, it is also clear that, when taking into account the whole complexity and 
richness of natural language meaning, compositional semantics is faced with a series of 
challenges. As a response to these challenges, semanticists have come up with several solu-
tions and amendments. These relate basically to (A) the syntax-semantics interface, (B) the 
relationship between semantics and ontology, and (C) the semantics-pragmatics  interface.
A Syntax-Semantics  Interface
One way to cope with challenges to compositionality is to adjust the syntax properly. 
This could be done, e.g., by introducing possibly mute, i.e. phonetically empty, functional 
heads into the syntactic tree that nevertheless carry semantic content, or by relating the 
semantic composition to a more abstract level of syntactic derivation – Logical Form – 
that may differ from surface structure due to invisible movement. That is, the syntactic 
structure on which the semantic composition is based may be more or less directly linked 
to surface syntax, such that it fi ts the demands of compositional semantics. Of course, any 
such move should be independently  motivated.
B Semantics –  Ontology
Another direction that might be explored in order to reconcile syntax and semantics is 
to reconsider the inventory of primitive semantic objects the semantic fabric is assumed 
to be composed of. A famous case in point is Davidson’s (1967) plea for an ontological 
category of events. A crucial motivation for this move was that the standard treatment of 
adverbial modifi ers at that time was insuffi cient insofar as it failed to account properly 
for the combinatorial behavior and entailments of adverbial expressions. By positing 
an additional event argument introduced by the verb, Davidson laid the grounds for a 
theory of adverbial modifi cation that would overcome these shortcomings. Under this 
assumption Davidson’s famous sentence (9a) takes a semantic representation along the 
lines of (9b):
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(9) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with the knife at  midnight.
 b.  ∃e [ butter (jones, the toast, e) & in (e, the bathroom) & instr (e, the knife) & at 
(e, midnight) ]
According to (9b), there was an event e of Jones buttering the toast, and this event was 
located in the bathroom. In addition, it was performed by using a knife as an instrument, 
and it took place at midnight. That is, Davidson’s move enabled standard adverbial modi-
fi ers to be treated as simple fi rst-order predicates that add information about the verb’s 
hidden event argument. The major merits of such a Davidsonian analysis are, fi rst, that it 
accounts for the typical entailment patterns of adverbial modifi ers directly on the basis 
of their semantic representation. That is, the entailments in (10) follow from (9b) simply 
by virtue of the logical rule of  simplifi cation.
(10) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom at  midnight.
 b. Jones buttered the toast in the  bathroom.
 c. Jones buttered the toast at  midnight.
 d. Jones buttered the  toast.
And, secondly, Davidson paved the way for treating adverbial modifi ers on a par with 
adnominal modifi ers. In the meantime, researchers working within the Davidsonian par-
adigm have discovered more and more fundamental analogies between the verbal and 
the nominal domain, attesting to the fruitfulness of Davidson’s  move.
In short, by enriching the semantic universe with a new ontological category of events, 
Davidson solved the compositionality puzzle of adverbials and arrived at a semantic 
theory superior to its competitors in both conceptual simplicity and empirical coverage. 
Of course once again, such a solution does not come without costs. With Quine’s (1958) 
dictum “No entity without identity!” in mind, any ontological category a semantic theory 
makes use of requires a proper ontological characterization and legitimization. In the 
case of events, this is still the subject of ongoing debates among  semanticists.
C Semantics-Pragmatics  Interface
Finally, challenges to compositionality might also be taken as an invitation to reconsider 
the relationship between semantics and pragmatics by asking how far the composition of 
sentential meaning goes, and what the principles of pragmatic enrichment and pragmatic 
licensing are. One notorious case in point is the adequate delineation of linguistic knowl-
edge and world knowledge. To give an example, when considering the sentences in (11), 
we know that each of them refers to a very different kind of opening event. Obviously, 
the actions underlying, for instance, the opening of a can differ substantially from those 
of opening one’s eyes or opening a fi le on a  computer.
(11) a. She opened the  can.
 b. She opened her  eyes.
 c. She opened the electronic  fi le.
To a certain extent, this knowledge is of linguistic signifi cance, as can be seen when taking 
into account the combinatorial behavior of certain  modifi ers:
1. Meaning in  linguistics 7
(11) a. She opened the can {with a knife, *abruptly, *with a double click}.
 b. She opened her eyes {*with a knife, abruptly, *with a double click}.
 c. She opened the electronic fi le {*with a knife, *abruptly, with a double click}.
A comprehensive theory of natural language meaning should therefore strive to 
account for these observations. Nevertheless, incorporating this kind of world knowl-
edge into compositional semantics would be neither feasible nor desireable. A possible 
solution for this dilemma lies in the notion of semantic underspecifi cation. Several pro-
posals have been developed which take the lexical meaning that is fed into semantic 
composition to be of an abstract, context neutral nature. In the case of to open in (11), 
for instance, this common meaning skeleton would roughly say that some action of an 
agent x on an object y causes a change of state such that y is accessible afterwards. This 
would be the verb’s constant meaning contribution that can be found in all sentences 
in (11a–c) and which is also present, e.g., in (11d), where we don’t have such clear intu-
itions about how x acted upon y, and which is therefore more liberal as to adverbial 
 modifi cation.
(11) d. She opened the gift {with a knife, abruptly, with a double click}.
That is, underspecifi cation accounts would typically take neither the type of action per-
formed by x nor the exact sense of accessibility of y as part of the verb’s lexical meaning. 
To account for this part of the meaning, compositional semantics is complemented by 
a procedure of pragmatic enrichment, by which the compositionally derived meaning 
skeleton is pragmatically specifi ed according to the contextually available world 
 knowledge.
Semantic underspecifi cation/pragmatic enrichment accounts provide a means for further 
specifying a compositionally well-formed, underspecifi ed meaning representation. A dif-
ferent stance towards the semantics-pragmatics interface is taken by so-called “coercion” 
approaches. These deal typically with the interpretation of sentences that are strictly speaking 
ungrammatical but might be “rescued” in a certain way. An example is given in (12).
(12) The alarm clock stood intentionally on the  table.
The sentence in (12) does not offer a regular integration for the subject-oriented adverbial 
intentionally, i.e, the subject NP the alarm clock does not fulfi ll the adverbial’s request for 
an intentional subject. Hence, a compositional clash results and the sentence is ungram-
matical. Nevertheless, although deviant, there seems to be a way to rescue the sentence so 
that it becomes acceptable and interpretable anyway. In the case of (12), a possible repair 
strategy would be to introduce an actor, who is responsible for the fact that the alarm clock 
stands on the table. This move would provide a suitable anchor for the adverbial’s semantic 
contribution. Thus, we understand (12) as saying that someone put the alarm clock on 
purpose on the table. That is, in case of a combinatorial clash, there seems to be a certain 
leeway for non-compositional adjustments of the compositionally derived meaning. The 
defective part is “coerced” into the right format. The exact mechanism of coercion and its 
grammatical and pragmatic licensing conditions are still poorly  understood.
In current semantic research many quite different directions are being explored 
with respect to the issues A–C. What version of the principle of compositionality 
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ultimately turns out to be the right one and how compositional semantics interacts 
with syntax, ontology, and pragmatics is, in the end, an empirical question. Yet, the 
results and insights obtained so far in this endeavor are already demonstrating the 
fruitfulness of reckoning with compositionality as a driving force in the constitution of 
natural language  meaning.
4. Context and  discourse
Speakers do not use sentences in isolation, but in the context of an utterance situation 
and as part of a longer discourse. The meaning of a sentence depends on the particular 
circumstances of its utterances, but also on the discourse context in which it is uttered. At 
the same time the meaning of linguistic expression changes the context, e.g., the infor-
mation available to speaker and hearer. The analysis of the interaction of context, dis-
course and meaning provides new and challenging issues to the research agenda in the 
semantics-pragmatics interface as described in the last section. In the following we focus 
on two aspects of these issues to illustrate how the concept of meaning described above 
can further be developed by theorizing on the interaction between sentence meaning, 
contextual parameters and discourse  structure.
So far we have characterized the meaning of a sentence by its truth conditions and, as 
a result, we have “considered semantics to be the study of propositions” (Stalnaker 1970: 
273). It is justifi ed by the very clear concept that meaning describes “how the world 
is”. However, linguistic expressions often need additional information to form proposi-
tions as sentences contain indexical elements, such as I, you, she, here, there, now and 
the tenses of verbs. Indexical expressions cannot be interpreted according to possible 
worlds, i.e. how the conditions might be, but they are interpreted according to the actual 
utterance situation. Intensive research into this kind of context dependency led to the 
conclusion that the proposition itself depends on contextual parameters like speaker, 
addressee, location, time etc. This dependency is most prominently expressed in Kaplan’s 
(1977) notion character for the meaning of linguistic expressions. The character of an 
expression is a function from the context of utterance c, which includes the values for the 
speaker, the hearer, the time, the location etc. to the proposition. Other expressions such 
as local, different, a certain, enemy, neighbor may contain “hidden” indexical parameters. 
They express their content dependent on one or more reference points given by the 
context. Thus meaning is understood as an abstract concept or function from contexts 
to propositions, and propositions themselves are described as functions from possible 
worlds into truth  conditions.
The meaning of a linguistic expression is infl uenced not only by such relatively con-
crete aspects of the situation of use as speaker and addressee, but also by intentional 
factors like the assumptions of the speaker and hearer about the world, their beliefs and 
their goals. This type of context is continuously updated by the information provided 
by each sentence in a discourse. We see that linguistic expressions are not only “con-
text-consumers”, but also “context-shifters”. This can be illustrated by examples from 
anaphora, presuppositions and various discourse  relations.
(13) a. A man walks in the park. He  smokes.
 b. #He smokes. A man walks in the  park.
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(14) a. Rebecca married Thomas. She regrets that she married  him.
 b Rebecca regrets that she married Thomas. ?She married  him.
(15) a. John left. Ann started to  cry.
 b. Ann started to cry. John  left.
In (13) the anaphoric pronoun needs an antecedent, in other words it is a context-
consumer as it takes the information provided in the context for fi xing its meaning. The 
indefi nite noun a man however is a context-shifter. It changes the context by introducing 
a discourse referent into the discourse or discourse structure such that the pronoun can 
be linked to it. In (13a) the indefi nite introduces the referent and the anaphoric pronoun 
can be linked to it, in (13b) the pronoun in the fi rst sentence has no antecedent and if the 
indefi nite noun phrase in the second clause should refer to the same discourse referent 
it must not be indefi nite. In (14) we see the contribution of presupposition to the con-
text. (14b) is odd, since one can regret only something that is known to have happened. 
To assert this again makes the contribution of the second sentence superfl uous and the 
small discourse incoherent. (15) provides evidence that we always assume some relation 
between sentences above a simple conjunction of two propositions. The relation could 
be a sequence of events or a causal relation between the two event, and this induces dif-
ferent meanings on the two small discourses as a whole. These and many more examples 
have led to the development of dynamic semantics, i.e. the view that meaning is shifting 
a given information status to a new  one.
There are different ways to model the context dependency of linguistic expressions 
and the choice among them is still an unresolved issue and a topic of considerable con-
temporary interest. We illustrate this by presenting one example from the literature. 
Stalnaker proposes to represent the context as a set of possible worlds that are shared by 
speaker and hearer, his “common ground”. A new sentence is interpreted with respect 
to the common ground, i.e. to a set of possible worlds. The interpretation of the sentence 
changes the common ground (given that the hearer does not reject the content of the 
sentence) and the updated common ground is the new context for the next sentence. 
Kamp (1988) challenges this view as problematic, as possible worlds do not provide 
enough linguistically relevant information, as the following example illustrates (due to 
Barbara Partee, fi rst discussed in Heim 1982: 21).
(16) Exactly one of the ten balls is not in the bag. It is under the  sofa.
(17) Exactly nine of the ten balls are in the bag. #It is under the  sofa.
Both sentences in (16) and (17) have the same truth conditions, i.e. in exactly all possible 
circumstances in which (16) is true (17) is true, too; still the continuation with the second 
sentence is only felicitous in (16), but not in (17). (16) explicitly introduces an antecedent 
in the fi rst sentence, and the pronoun in the second sentence can be anaphorically linked 
to it. In (17), however, no explicit antecedent is introduced and therefore we cannot 
resolve the anaphoric reference of the pronoun. Extensive research on these issues has 
proven very fruitful for the continuous developing of our methodological tools and for 
our understanding of natural language meaning in context and its function for discourse 
 structure.
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5. Meaning in contemporary  semantics
Meaning is a notion investigated by a number of disciplines, including linguistics, philos-
ophy, psychology, artifi cial intelligence, semiotics as well as many others. The defi nitions of 
meaning are as manifold and plentiful as the different theories and perspectives that arise 
from these disciplines. We have argued here that in order to use meaning as a well-defi ned 
object of investigation, we must perceive facts to be explained and have tests to expose the 
underlying phenomena, and we must have a well-defi ned scientifi c apparatus which allows 
us to describe, analyze and model these phenomena. This scientifi c apparatus is contempo-
rary semantics: It possesses a clearly defi ned terminology, it provides abstract representa-
tions and it allows for formal modeling that adheres to scientifi c standards and renders 
predictions that can be verifi ed or falsifi ed. We have illustrated the tenets, tools and goals of 
contemporary semantics by discussing typical approaches to three central characteristics 
of meaning: truth conditionality, compositionality, and context and  discourse.
Recent times have witnessed an increased interest of semanticists in developing their 
theories on a broader basis of empirical evidence, taking into account crosslinguistic 
data, diachronic data, psycho- and neurolinguistic studies as well as corpus linguistic and 
computational linguistic resources. As a result of these efforts, contemporary semantics is 
characterized by a continuous explanatory progress, an increased awareness of and pro-
fi ciency in methodological issues, and the emergence of new opportunities for interdisci-
plinary cooperation. Along these lines, the articles of this handbook develop an integral, 
many-faceted and yet well-rounded picture of this joint endeavour in the linguistic study 
of natural language  meaning.
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